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The greening of European electricity industry: A battle of 
modernities 
 
Atle Midttun 
Abstract 
Europe has played the role of a green hegemon on the global arena for several decades. By 
exploring its green transition in the electricity industry, the article discusses whether Europe is 
on track with regard to delivering sustainable development in a core sector at home. 
 The article finds that the greening of European electricity industry has been highly 
dynamic and can best be represented in terms of competing modernities; where carbon, 
nuclear, renewables and demand side management challenge each other in the race for 
sustainable energy solutions.  
 The article describes Greening European electricity industry as a complex institutional 
game which resembles a relay race where various factors have driven innovation at different 
stages. Change may be initially have been politically driven, while the baton is later taken by 
markets, technology or civic mobilization.  The article shows how strong greening policies 
may lead to blockage, whereas softer and less confrontational policies with triggering effects 
may have a better chance of success.  
 The article also argues that a central factor in the apparent European success in 
greening electricity has been an advantageous blend of technology push and market pull 
approaches, which has merged out of national rivalry rather than coordinated planning. 
 
Transformation of large socio-technical systems 
 In a mature economy, such as that of Western Europe, as well as in the East-European 
catch-up economies, the buildup of an alternative green modernity is not a ‘greenfield’ 
operation, but a change of course or even a fundamental substitution of an existing large 
industrial system—a system which has been built up around core technologies and institutions 
bought into by the public and enhanced by supportive rules and regulations (a sociotechnical 
system) (Hughes, 1983). Radical and large scale change such as the transition to a post-carbon 
energy system, therefore involves emergence of rivaling techno-economic paradigms with 
competing technologies, business models and institutional regimes (Midttun, 1988). 
 Due to previous build-up of commercial interests, regulation and social buy-in to 
established technologies, the incumbent configuration usually carries considerable inertia. 
Sector-institutions enable it to protect itself from change, and maintain established economic 
and institutional patterns. Hence new green alternatives are destined to fight a tough uphill 
battle, where they will have to win the goodwill of policy-makers and regulatory authorities, 
convince industrial strategists, gain the confidence of investors and engage consumers. 
 The dynamics of growth and transition of a large sociotechnical system can be 
illustrated in terms of a standard product cycle model with an institutional dimension added 
(Fig. 1). A new technology emerges and grows, and stimulates institution-building around it. 
Successful institution building in turn stimulates industrial growth (indicated by the shaded 
area ‘‘a’’). At the peak of its development, the sector emerges with a strong industrial 
base supported by strong sectoral institutions that allow it to expand and retain its position 
beyond what would have occurred under neutral institutions (indicated by the shaded area 
‘‘b’’)  
Fig.1. Illustration of the implications of institutional lag.  
Source: Based on Midttun 1988.  
 
 Under full socio-technical alignment around a common technological paradigm, only 
one dominant product cycle exists. Under transition, however, multiple systems emerge in 
parallel, creating misalignment and potential realignment around alternative techno-economic 
paradigms. With analogy to technological innovation, one may speak of conforming or 
disruptive transformation (Christensen, 1997). System conforming transformation implies 
techno-economic transformation within the boundaries of existing institutions and vested 
interests. As illustrated in Fig. 2, the new paradigm appears as the prolongation of the old, as a 
new and better version, within the same institutional, social and commercial coordinates. 
Disruptive transformation, however, involves transformation also in the institutional setting, 
and creates disruptive change in business models, social practice and political regulation. 
Greening of the European electricity industry, in other words, is likely to provoke tensions 
and challenges not only at the industrial and technological, but also at the institutional level. 
Fig. 2.  Conforming and disruptive transformation (Based on standard S-curve theory; Christensen’s (1997) concept of disruptive innovation and Midttun’s (1988) theory of institutional lag).                      
  The current transformation of the European electricity sector with regard to meeting 
the climate challenge involves several rivaling socio-technical paradigms competing for 
hegemony, one of which is a transformation of the incumbent carbon-technology 
into a low carbon future. The paper, therefore, presents the current remodeling of European 
electricity industry to meet the climate challenge as a battle of four modernities. 
 We have chosen the term ‘‘modernity’’ in a narrow sense, to indicate that all the 
rivaling paradigms advocate ‘‘modern’’ energy systems capable of carrying advanced high-
tech welfare societies.1
                                                          
1 Rather than centering exclusively on their technological basis, we focus on how energy-technologies are embedded in organisational arrangements and 
 The earliest, carbon modernity, was built up since the late 1800s and 
through much of the 1900s as a way to power modern industrial society to allow it to produce 
mass consumer goods. The second, nuclear modernity, was launched as a civilian application 
of nuclear technology, which had been developed for military purpose during World War II. 
This peaceful application was envisaged to transcend the limitations of carbon based energy 
and move the world into a phase of nonpolluting energy-abundance. The third eco-modernity 
wider social and political ideas and visions. 
emerged out of a critique of the second, and focused on an alternative, post-carbon modernity 
based on renewables capable of providing adequate energy to modern societies without 
exposing them to either climate or nuclear risk. The fourth demand side ecomodernity focuses 
on demand side management and energy supply located close to the consumer. Concepts such 
as ‘energyplus’ houses and ‘smart grids’ are presented as alternatives to both carbon, nuclear 
and renewable based technologies supplied over the central grid.  
 Given the extensive infrastructure and institutional structures built up around 
electricity supply, the battle of carbon, nuclear and eco-modernities is a battle for the greening 
of Europe within different institutional co-ordinates: The carbon and nuclear modernities 
imply a continuation of the scale and scope economics of large centralized systems, though 
with a radical change of generation technology in the nuclear case. Supply side eco-modernity 
adds new resource bases with extensive re-location of electricity generation and raises new 
demands for balancing intermittent solar and wind supply. Demand side eco-modernity moves 
the focus out of the energy system and radically targets the consumer side where energy 
efficiency and self-supply become dominant concerns. 
 The paper draws on a vast number of secondary sources, ranging from research reports 
and articles to international energy statistics and policy documents, particularly from the 
European Commission. It also builds on information and reports from industrial associations 
and core European industrial actors. The main objective of the paper is to develop a holistic 
and synthetic conceptual framework for understanding the European electricity sector’s 
strategies to meet the climate challenge. 
Carbon modernity 
Carbon based electricity incumbents have met the climate challenge with a 
combination of incremental and radical, but system-conforming technological innovation and 
business strategies. They have basically followed a successful pattern from the 1970s and 
1980s when they met the challenges of local pollution and acid rain with new filters and 
higher efficiency.  
The most conventional approach has been to meet the climate challenge through 
efficiency improvements in coal-based generation technology designed to also bring down 
carbon emissions. It has also made attempts at combining coal with bio-fuels, as well as 
switching to gas with low CO2 emissions. 
Fig. 3. Carbon modernity: generation by source 1973–2010.  
Source: IEA (2011a). 
 
 
 A more radical, but still system-conforming strategy has been to move from coal to 
gas-based generation. Dominantly coal based incumbents in Western Europe see shifting from 
coal to ‘‘low carbon’’ gas turbines as a central part of its adaptation in the context of climate 
change. Gas has indeed increased its share of electricity generation dramatically over the last 
decades. While coal has lost market shares in the European electricity market, the gas strategy 
has been highly successful, allowing carbon modernity to more or less retain its position (Fig. 
3). 
 In a more radical approach, carbon based electricity industry has sought to reinvent 
itself close to a zero-carbon solution. Carbon capture and storage (CCS), in which CO2 from 
power plants is captured at the plant and then transported and injected underground, is 
represented as the central gateway out of the climate squeeze for carbon-based electricity 
generation, making the use of fossil-fuel power plants virtually CO2-free. 
 Due to its political strength, the carbon based electricity industry has been able to 
mobilize extensive public funding into its climate-oriented innovation programs. Nevertheless, 
CCS technology at its present state incurs great efficiency losses and added costs that prevent 
large scale rollouts anytime soon. 
 The political strength and institutional backing of carbon modernity in confronting 
climate change is underlined by its ability to resist and strongly modify twomajor EU 
initiatives to deal with CO2 emissions from the carbon economy: the CO2/Energy tax and the 
European emissions trading scheme (EU Commission, 1997, 1999; Midttun and Koefoed, 
2003). The European Commission’s proposal for a carbon tax, in the early 1990s was shot 
down by powerful procarbon lobbies in European heavy weight countries like Germany. 
Following the CO2 tax failure, the next and more successful European green policy initiative 
was the European emissions trading system (EU ETS). However, as the ETS allowed for 
decentralized adaptation, consisting of the allocation of allowances that took place at the 
member state level. Carbon interests could be weighted in by so called generous 
‘grandfathering’ that gave large exemptions for existing generation capacity. 
 The social legitimacy of carbon modernity, in spite of the climate challenge, lies in the 
perception of carbon modernity as the basis for modernity as such. Throughout the 20th 
century electricity became a critical feature of modern life in mature western economies that 
citizens have not wanted to give up. However, faced with the carbon economy’s potentially 
devastating climate effects, they and are now left deeply split (Litvine and Wustenhagen, 
2011). On the one hand they see the need for urgent climate action, well aware of the carbon 
bias of today’s electricity supply. On the other hand, electricity consumption in Europe has 
continued to grow, in spite of strong citizen recognition of the need for limitations to prevent 
climate change. Apparently, consumers expect to be able to retain modernity with all its 
benefits under a new climate-compatible regime. Hence the carbon incumbents have found 
public support for slow gradual and system compatible change rather than a dramatic exit out 
of carbon modernity. 
Nuclear modernity 
 The mainstream electricity industry in Europe would have met the climate challenge 
from a very different position if one of its most radical innovation projects – nuclear energy – 
had not seriously backfired. For the three decades following World War II, nuclear modernity 
was seen as a sustaining innovation beyond the carbon age, that retained many of the systemic 
characteristics of a central-station-based carbon modernity, while escaping from many of its 
vices. It was believed that nuclear power would render conventional power sources such as 
coal and oil obsolete, and that atomic energy would ‘‘provide the power needed to supply 
cheap energy for all’’. 
 Initial skepticism in the electricity industry was overcome by extensive support from 
public authorities through financial guarantees, massive research investments, and back-up 
from national military-industrial complexes. With the assurance of a prolonged transition 
period which would allow them to amortize their carbon investments, the incumbent 
electricity industry largely took nuclear power on board. 
 Nuclear modernity thus acquired public legitimacy as a successor to the carbon 
predecessor by upholding the modern lifestyle. From a commercial and technological 
perspective nuclear energy came to be seen as part of a high-tech nuclear industrial complex 
with attractive possibilities for industrial expansion and interesting and prestigious job 
opportunities. From a political point of view, nuclear technology was seen as a key to 
progress, and like carbon modernity, nuclear modernity was written into the constitution of 
the new Europe in the treaty of Rome in 1957.2
Fig. 4. Nuclear modernity: generation by source, 1973–2010. 
Source: IEA (2011a). 
 Furthermore, nuclear electricity was seen to 
provide an answer to early environmental problems of the carbon economy such as smog and 
acid rain. 
 
 
 
 Following a massive buildup of nuclear energy in several countries throughout the 
1960s, 1970s and early 1980s, nuclear energy became a major force in Europe with an 
impressive 25% of electricity generated in the region (Fig. 4). In Belgium, France, Hungary, 
Lithuania and Slovakia it even became a leading electric power source (Wikipedia, 2011). 
The early boom for nuclear energy was matched by favorable public policies as the industry 
received the lion’s share of the European research budgets as well as generous government 
guarantees to cover most of the costs from nuclear accidents over public budgets. 
 However, as nuclear industry expanded, the risks associated with it became more 
evident. Following a series of minor accidents and leaks throughout the 1960s and 1970s, 
nuclear power was faced with widespread public unease, coming to a head in the Three Mile 
Island accident in 1979, and the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. These accidents, led to massive 
civic protests in several countries, and nuclear modernity came to be associated with 
politically unacceptable risks. The public at large thereby joined the financial industry in 
seeing nuclear industry as too risky to be involved with. The first wave of nuclear power was 
                                                          
2 The signatories to the Euratom treaty thus ‘‘resolved to create the conditions required for the development of a powerful nuclear industry which will provide 
extensive supplies of energy, [and] lead to the modernization of technical processes…’’ Euratom Treaty (1957). 
thus stranded both in the USA and most of Europe, and new investments in nuclear capacity 
plummeted in the 1990s and early 2000s and nuclear power thus lost market shares (Fig. 5). 
Fig. 5. Number of reactors (and total reactor capacity) under construction from 1951 to 2011. Source: IEA (2011b)  
 
 After more than 20 years without total nuclear accidents, nuclear modernity sought a 
comeback in Europe in the early 2000s, re-launching itself as a major solution to the climate 
challenge. Strong industrial actors, supported politically by a group of states, notably France, 
Finland and several East European member states, saw nuclear energy as the major driver of a 
postcarbon transition in the European Union. The sector was seen to represent a source of 
energy with low carbon levels and relatively stable costs, which made it attractive both from 
the point of view of security of supply and fighting climate change—two of Europe’s major 
policy concerns. 
 Yet once again a serious nuclear accident – at the Fukushima plant in Japan – 
dramatically shook up the nuclear growth scenario. The accident in Japan once again 
challenged the nuclear lobby with a demonstration of nuclear risk that sparked public debate 
and triggered nuclear moratoria in several European countries, notably its biggest economy, 
Germany.3
 Nuclear modernity remains thus highly ambivalent and contested as a climate strategy 
for the European electricity industry. Judging from the extensive delays and large cost-
overruns for the latest European nuclear power stations, nuclear power also seems to be 
struggling with its economic competitiveness. 
 
                                                          
3 The back-down from nuclear energy came after strong civic engagement. In March 2011, following the Fukushima accident, more than 200,000 people took 
part in anti-nuclear protests in four large German cities, on the eve of state elections and Chancellor Angela Merkel’s coalition announced on May 30, 2011, 
that Germany’s 17 nuclear power stations will be shut down by 2022. 
Fig. 6. EU power capacity mix in 2000 and 2011. Source: IEA (2011a). 
 
 
Supply side eco-modernity 
 Eco-modernity meets the climate challenge in an early phase of the product cycle. As 
opposed to the incumbent industry, ecomodernity is concerned with the climate challenge not 
as a secondary add-on, but as a primary raison d’ˆetre. In addition to confronting the challenge 
of greening, the challenge for ecomodernity is to provide a credible alternative to carbon or 
nuclear as the stable mainstream energy source capable of supplying the needs of modern 
society.  
 Initially, renewables were seen as marginal, unstable and unscalable sources of energy, 
too costly to compete with the incumbent coal and nuclear plants, and conflicting with the 
basic centralistic institutional and infrastructural design of carbon and nuclear modernities. 
Strong policy initiatives combined with active engagement from new entrepreneurial 
industrial players boosted growth in renewable energy throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. 
From a marginal add-on to carbon and nuclear modernity, renewables-based energy has 
grown into a major alternative in its own right. 
 The European electricity system featured extensive green transformation already after 
the first decade of the new millennium. With a larger share of installed capacity in renewables 
than in nuclear, green electricity is moving from niche positions to factors to be counted 
within mainstream supply, alongside largescale hydro (Fig. 6). 
Hydropower 
 Although many of the renewable energy technologies are in the early stages of the 
product cycle, renewable energy also features hydropower, one of the most mature energy 
technologies. Hydropower has traditionally been the major source of renewable electricity, 
and accounts for approximately 16% of European electricity supply (IEA, 2011a). It has been 
central to electricity generation from the start in the late 19th century and therefore represents 
a familiar technology to mainstream industrial actors.4
 However, much of the exploitable large scale hydropower has already been utilized, 
and remaining projects entail conflicts with other uses of water, such as irrigation, recreation 
and fisheries, as well as concomitant environmental and social stemming from dam 
construction inundation of large areas by reservoirs. These disadvantages now limit further 
exploitation of large-scale hydropower many places in Europe, and has forced a continuation 
of hydropower on a smaller and more socially acceptable scale
 
5, where projects are designed 
to blend in with nature and the landscape (Hydroworld. Com, 2011).6
 While hydropower cannot play a major direct role in expanding green electricity, it 
may nevertheless play an important facilitating role as balancing power in response to the 
penetration of new intermittent renewable resources. The remarkably high Danish wind power 
share (more than 20% of total electricity supply) is thus effectively facilitated by using the 
Nordic hydropower system as a buffer. Attempts are also being made to broaden access to 
Nordic hydropower also in response to German and UK wind initiatives. Reservoir-based 
hydropower with efficient output regulation and capacity for storing large quantities of energy 
is thus acquiring an extended role as a green battery for one of Europe’s most wind intensive 
regions. Similar use of Alpine hydropower reservoirs may play a major role in balancing 
intermittent renewable electricity supply in Europe. 
 
                                                          
4 Installed hydropower in Europe totals approximately 179,000 MW. European countries with the largest amounts of hydro include France, Italy, Norway, and 
Spain (Barnes, 2012). Estimated exploitable hydropower potential in Europe is 1670 TW h/a, but only 745 TW h/a were actually supplied by hydropower in 
1990, and some 1080 TW h/a are expected to be available in 2020 (Lehner et al., 2012). Although there is a debate around methane emissions from 
hydropower reservoirs, in boreal reservoirs of Canada and Northern Europe, however, greenhouse gas emissions are typically only 2% to 8% of any kind of 
conventional fossil-fuel thermal generation (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hydroelectricity#Methane_emissions_.28from_reservoirs.29). 
5 Small hydropower is by no means new, and In 2006 there were nearly 23,000 small hydropower plants in the EU-27 including candidate countries Norway, 
Switzerland, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Montenegro, with an installed capacity more than 15,000 MW and a generation of nearly 52 TW h (European 
Renewable Energy Council). For small hydro (less than 10 MW), development opportunities are significant. Provided the mandate by EU member countries is 
implemented on a timely basis, the European Small Hydropower Association (ESHA) estimates that installed small hydro capacity could increase by more 
than 4000-MW over current levels (Hydroworld.com March 2011). http://www.hydroworld.com/index/display/article. 
6 The emphasis in Western Europe is to retrofit hydro plants with modern equipment, usually upgrading the capacity of the plant. In Eastern Europe, the 
focus is rehabilitating ageing plants that often were allowed to deteriorate during the era of the Soviet Union. 
Fig. 7. Annual installed wind capacity by region. Source: Global Wind Energy Council (2011).  
 
Wind 
 Over the last decade, Europe has seen a dramatic increase in wind power, indicating 
that it has entered the rapid growth phase of the product cycle (Fig. 7).7
 The pioneering Danish leadership is now followed by Germany which is the EU 
country with the largest installed capacity, followed by Spain, Italy, France and the UK 
(EWA—European Wind Energy Association, 2012). However, China is rapidly outpacing 
Europe in new capacity. 
 Spearheaded by an 
early Danish initiative in the 1980s, the region has become a technology leader and a lead 
market for wind. Denmark, did not only pioneer wind energy as an early starter, but also 
transcended the niche limitations and built up a world record wind supply amounting to more 
than 20% of total electricity consumption. 
 Following saturation of acceptable land sites and conflicts over land use in several 
European countries, wind power has expanded offshore. Once again, Europe has become a 
leading market with a growth of more than 50% during 2010. The U.K., followed by 
Denmark and the Netherlands are leading this development. 
                                                          
7 A total of 93,957 MW is now installed in the European Union, an increase of 11% over 2010. 
Solar 
Following ambitious policy initiatives, Europe has also made extensive advances in 
photovoltaic electricity.8
 In 2010, for the first time, Europe’s photovoltaic sector installed more new capacity 
than any other renewable electricity source over the year (Photovoltaic Barometer, 2011). 
With over 80% of global installed capacity, Europe continues to be a leading market for 
photovoltaic installation (Fig. 8). 
 With both centralized and local decentralized applications, solar 
energy has a valuable flexibility allowing it to adapt to diverse social and commercial needs. 
Growing contributions from Southern European countries are increasing the average load 
factor of this capacity and thereby enhancing solar energy’s competitiveness. 
 This development was mainly driven by three markets: Italy, Germany and France. 
The UK also delivered a surprising development during 2011. Other key markets in Europe 
were Belgium, Spain, Slovakia, and Greece (EPIA, 2011). 
Biomass 
 Biomass, the fourth major source of green electricity has also expanded its market 
share significantly in the early 2000s although not as dramatically as wind and solar. 
Electricity production originating from biomass was 121 TWh in 2009 in the EU-27, with an 
average yearly increase of almost 13.5% between 2001 and 2009. Germany kept its role as the 
biggest bioelectricity producer, followed by Sweden and UK. These three countries represent 
almost half (48%) of the total production within the EU-27 Member States (Fig. 9) (J ¨ager-
Waldau et al., 2011). 
 Following a critical debate on the use of agricultural land for energy crops, biomass 
based energy in Europe has concentrated on waste and forestry. Wood and wood waste 
remain the main source with a proportion of 53%, followed by municipal solid waste (28%) 
and biogas (19%) (Jager-Waldau et al., 2011). 
 The composition of bio-electricity, however varies from country to country. While 
Germany has developed a balanced bioelectricity production across all categories, the Nordic 
countries have achieved their leading position more exclusively through exploitation of their 
vast wood and wood waste resources. The UK, on the other hand has taken a leading position 
in biogas production. 
                                                          
8 The growth rate of PV during 2011 reached almost 70%, an outstanding level among all renewable technologies (EPIA, 2011). 
Ocean power: Next generation renewables 
 While the first generation ‘‘new’’ renewables are now well on their way towards 
commercial viability, a second generation is making its early entry, and Europe is again 
taking a leading role. Most prominent in this generation is a series of ocean-based 
technologies, including wave, tidal (barrages and turbines), osmotic power, and ocean thermal 
energy conversion (OTEC) systems (REN21, 2011). 
Fig. 8. Cumulative installed solar power. 
 
Fig. 9. Bioelectricity installed Capacity (MW) in the EU27 in 2009 by Categories. Source: Jäger-Waldau et al.: Renewable Energy Shapshots, 2011. 
 
 Though ocean energy technologies are not yet economically competitive with more 
mature renewable energy technologies  such as wind, in the medium term these technologies 
could become significant contributors to markets in coastal states (European Ocean Energy 
Association, 2012). While the sector is 15–25 years behind wind energy, it is poised to follow 
a similar path to wider commercialization. 
 While limited to costal states, ocean energy has a vast potential. The worldwide wave 
energy contribution to the electricity market is estimated to be of the same order of magnitude 
as world electrical energy production capacity. Wave energy has the highest density among 
all renewable energy sources (European Ocean energy Association, 2012). 
 Europe is once again playing a leading role in green technology deployment. Many 
ocean power projects are already operative in Europe, with the majority operating off the 
coasts of Portugal and the United Kingdom for short-term testing and demonstration, and a 
few prototypes were initiating first steps. 
 One of the advantages of combining the new generation of ocean power with the 
previous generation of renewables nevertheless is that wave power production is much 
smoother and more consistent than wind or solar, resulting in higher overall capacity factors. 
As such it is attractive as a supplementary energy source. 
 The ability to trigger several generations of renewable technologies carries the promise 
of furnishing the continent with the emerging broad portfolio of technological options for a 
selfcontained eco-modernity in electricity provision. 
Demand side eco-modernity 
 While carbon, nuclear and supply-side eco-modernities compete with alternatives of 
electricity generation, demand-side eco-modernity shifts the focus to the consumer and 
reduces dependency on centralized generation through efficiency improvement and self-
generation. 
 It remains a paradox that while demand side eco-modernity is widely considered to 
contain some of the lowest hanging fruits in CO2 mitigation (von Weizs¨acker et al., 2009) 
(Fig. 10), it has been trailing behind supply side approaches both at the policy and industrial 
levels. This reflects established policy and industrial organization around centralized supply-
side energy solutions. 
 EU energy policy is no exception. On the one hand the EU considers energy efficiency 
to be one of the most cost effective ways to enhance security of its energy supply and to 
reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and other pollutants. It has therefore set itself the target 
of saving 20% of its primary energy consumption compared to projections by 2020 (EU 
Commission, 2012). Yet, on the other hand, the EU is on track to achieve only half of the 
reductions as opposed to its far more successful policy implementation of green energy 
production.9
                                                          
9 Overall energy efficiency in the EU-27 has only improved by about 13% between 1996 and 2007 while EU households have only improved their energy 
  
efficiency. In households, energy efficiency improved by 1.1%/year since 1990 (Wikipedia, 2012). 
 Fig. 10. Overall cost-curve for energy efficiency options of end-use sectors in the EU27 in 2020. Energy savings are expressed in final energy units. Source: McKinsey (2009). 
 
 
 
Fig. 11. Smart grid. Source: IEEE, 2009 
 
 
  
 To reap the full potential of demand side eco-modernity there is a need to align policy, 
regulation, and public awareness in a broad range of fields, such as housing, transport, 
services and industry. Since policies are typically sectorally focused, crosscutting demand 
side eco-modernity is difficult to institutionalize. 
 To mention some examples, hurdles from the housing sector include principal-agent 
problems where the decision maker may be (partially) detached from the price signals. The 
most visible example is in rental markets, where building owners are responsible for 
investment decisions, but tenants pay the energy bills. In addition, policies that allow utilities 
to increase their profits by selling more electricity or natural gas are disincentives to effective 
utility energy efficiency programs. Many utilities also have applied tariffs and interconnection 
standards that discourage end users from adopting energy-efficient solutions. 
 Another hindrance is the often decentralized nature of the institutional competences in 
the building sector, with national, regional and local authorities playing different roles in 
enforcement, subsidy allocation, tax policy, etc. In the absence of proper coordination, this 
can easily result in sub-optimal support for energy efficiency in buildings (Directorate-general 
for energy (EU commission), 2012). 
 Nevertheless, the European Commission is now moving ahead with an energy 
efficiency directive (EU Commission, 2011b), and new demand-side initiatives are now being 
piloted in European nation states. Spearheaded by Germany and Scandinavia, Europe has 
staged a number of pioneering energy efficiency and selfgeneration projects in the housing 
sector, under the term ‘‘passive houses’’ or ‘‘zero energy buildings ‘‘or ‘‘energy plus 
buildings’’. Pioneering initiatives are also tapping into large energy efficiency and demand-
side electricity production potentials in industry. 
 Demand side eco-modernity does not only involve decentralized demand-side 
management, but also means integrating demand- and supply-side measures in new ways. So-
called ‘Smart Grid Initiatives’ are tapping into this potential via advanced information 
technology, thus optimally coordinating supply and demand (Fig. 11). Seen from the supply-
side, smart grids enhance reliability, and reduce peak demand by shifting usage to off-peak 
hours. Seen from the demand-side, smart grids allow consumers to actively manage their local 
energy consumption and production up against the central generation system. In this way 
consumers may change positions as both net producers and consumers over time. 
 One decade into the 21st century demand-side eco-modernity remains at an early stage 
of achievement. There is a technological potential for reducing energy demand in space 
heating, hot water systems, appliances, indoor lighting and refrigeration with more than a 
factor 5, and there is a large technological and commercial potential for more dynamic 
optimization of demand and supply. Yet very little of this volume is targeted by effective 
political and commercial strategies, and the smart grid interface necessary to unleash these 
possibilities is still in the making. There are, however, signs of growth. To mention one 
example, the Italian electricity incumbent, Enel has been an early European front-runner, 
allowing Italian customers to view the information regarding their energy consumption thanks 
to electronic smart meters and remote management infrastructure.10
 In private housing and public buildings passive or positive energy housing involve a 
variety of techniques which both minimize energy use and maximize renewable energy 
generation in residential and commercial buildings. This includes energysaving modernization 
of buildings, ranging from refurbishing of windows, increased insulation and other energy 
efficiency measures. However, it also includes on-site active renewable energy technologies 
like photovoltaic to offset the building’s primary energy consumption and dispense with 
conventional heating systems. 
A number of other 
companies have followed in Sweden, Finland and Denmark, and extensive rollouts of 
advanced metering infrastructure is planned in several of the larger EU member states, such as 
France, the U.K., and Spain (Greentechmedia, 2012). 
 With respect to industrial energy efficiency and self-generation, the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that spreading industrial best practices in sectors such as 
chemicals, iron and steel, cement, pulp and paper would imply energy savings of more than 
30% (IEA, 2007). More radical examples can be found in the Swedish paper and pulp 
industry which, under the Swedish electricity certificate scheme has turned from a 
conventional large-scale consumer of electricity and fuel to an efficient producer based on 
waste bark, branches and wood chips (ABB Asea Browh Boweri, 2011). 
Institutional facilitation 
 Europe’s leading role in climate policy and its strong initiatives for green 
transformation of electricity industry has been facilitated by three main factors: (1) Green 
civic and political radicalization stimulated by anti-nuclear protests; (2) Possibilities provided 
by a rich multilevel institutional structure, and (3) A broad set of policy instruments that have 
generated several technological routes. These factors have provided an institutional stimulus 
both to sustaining and disruptive transformation. 
                                                          
10 In the early 2000s Enel, installed 33 million smart meters through its Telegestore project, which is one of the largest and most widespread remote 
management infrastructure projects in the world and is a benchmark for all energy distribution companies (Enel, 2012). 
Green radicalisation 
 At the political level green radicalization, in particular in Europe’s Northwestern 
fringe, opened up a broad eco-modernity agenda alongside the carbon and nuclear incumbents. 
Antinuclear civic action, that spiked after the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents, 
merged with broad green parties that gained political influence through political alliances, and 
both stimulated and facilitated eco-modernity.  
 The nuclear opposition in several European countries grew steadily more radical 
through clashes with established pronuclear elites over nuclear installations, and the 
confrontations provoked by the Three Mile Island and the Chernobyl nuclear accidents. 
Ultimately this brought down the program of nuclear modernity in several European countries 
and boosted the ‘‘green opposition’’ with visions of an alternative renewable energy future. 
 The emergence of green opposition took various forms across Europe. In Sweden the 
anti-nuclear opposition was able to mobilize a nuclear referendum already in 1980, the year 
after Three Mile Island, leading to a moratorium on nuclear energy in Sweden. Out of the 
nuclear opposition movement grew a green party referred to in Sweden as simply Miljöpartiet: 
‘The Environmental Party’. It won seats in the of Swedish Parliament for the first time in 
1988, failed to pass the 4% cutoff in the following election in 1991, but returned again in 
1994 and has held seats since, getting around 5% in every election. In the election in 2010 
they got 7.34%, making them the third biggest party in Sweden.  
 The nuclear crises also boosted the green opposition in Denmark, which gradually 
merged with the left wing party and the people’s socialist party. Driven by the green visions, 
Denmark rejected nuclear option and even legislated a prohibition against nuclear energy in 
1988, following the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. Instead, the country embarked on an 
alternative ecological modernity, spearheaded by an ambitious wind-energy program. 
 Germany has been a battleground of the nuclear and eco modernities. With its strong 
industrial basis, the country has aspired to be a nuclear technology leader, but it also sees the 
rise of a persistent opposition which has extensive mobilizing power. Since the early clashes 
over location of nuclear plants outside the village of Wyhl in 1971, Germany has been 
engaged in hefty nuclear battles, including clashes over the Brokdorf reactor on the North Sea 
coast, the fast breeder reactor at Kalkar in the lower Rhine region and many others. The Three 
Mile Island accident in the US fostered large demonstrations against a reprocessing plant in 
Gorleben, and this stimulated the German Green Party, which became one of the most 
influential forces of green politics in Europe. They were founded in 1980 and have been in 
coalition governments at state level for some years. At the federal level, the green party held 
government with the Social Democratic Party of Germany in a so-called Red-Green Alliance 
from 1998 to 2005 during which a Germany took several initiatives to boos ecomodernity. In 
2001, this government also reached an agreement on nuclear power in Germany, and thus 
formally halted the expansion of nuclear modernity. 
Multilevel institutional pluralism 
  The interpenetration of alternative modernities has also profited from the rich 
web of national diversity, multilevel decisionmaking and institutional pluralism in Europe, 
which has limited the power incumbency and created multiple entry points for climate-
oriented entrepreneurship. While national subsidiarity has created multiple spaces for 
specialized entrepreneurship and innovation, the wider European market has facilitated 
learning and adaptation across boundaries. 
Institutional pluralism and national diversity 
 Institutional pluralism and multilevel decision-making is in part embodied in the 
European Union’s open method of coordination that encourages specific flexible and 
negotiated solutions. While a common set of norms is implemented in all member states, they 
are allowed to pursue them scaled to the level of national capacity, and with a variety of 
technologies and policy means. The European construction with common over-arching goals, 
but with generous subsidiarity in policy implementation, has thus opened up for extensive 
national diversity and even rivalry. Different European nations have promoted new 
technologies where they have seen the greatest industrial potential. Sweden and Finland have 
launched forestry-based biofuels, Germany and Spain photovoltaics, Denmark, followed by 
Germany and Spain—wind, and the UK taking initiatives in offshore wind and early stage 
ocean technologies. This has not prevented France from strong engagement in favor of the 
nuclear climate solution. However, by letting national diversity play itself out on the common 
European arena, the EU avoids a majoritarian lock in to incumbent energy technologies and 
opens up for competing modernities. The national rivalry for the exploration of alternative 
green technologies has in part been driven by green policy-visions which followed the rise of 
green political mobilization, and by aspirations of technology leadership under anticipated 
green growth. 
 In addition to facilitating national climate initiatives, the EU itself has stimulated both 
eco-modernity and carbon based climate innovation by setting ambitious overarching climate 
targets which have served to speed up implementation throughout the region. As opposed to 
national targets that may be nationally renegotiated, EU-level binding targets provide 
obligations for countries under threat of EU sanctions.11
 
 
Interfaces with market de-regulation 
 The EU has also facilitated a new commercial dynamic space for commercially based 
climate initiatives through its extensive de-regulation of European energy markets. Energy 
businesses have re-configured strategically to meet new market opportunities and are 
increasingly seeing eco-modernity as part of their strategic agenda. Green policy initiatives 
have also created market- stimuli that support green commercial engagement in ecomodernity 
on par with carbon- and nuclear engagements. In response, the green industrial segment is 
rapidly increasing volume and gradually strengthening its voice in industrial policy, alongside 
carbon and nuclear incumbents on the European electricity scene. 
A relay model 
 The European success in pioneering transition towards climate-sustainability 
resembles, in many ways, a relay race, where various factors have driven innovation at 
different stages. At one point change may be politically driven, while at another point the 
baton is taken by markets, technology or civic mobilization. Causality may therefore change 
as in a relay run, across politics, markets, technology and civic engagement. In addition, 
chance events may transform the contest. 
 The logic of the relay process can be described in terms of an open game tree, where 
each step elicits blockage or further policy evolution in the same direction as the sequential 
triggering takes place (Midttun, Anne Louise 2003) (Fig. 12). While strong policies may 
easily lead to blockage, softer and less confrontational policies with triggering effects in other 
institutional domains may have better chance of success. The sequential triggering may build 
momentum behind green policies and move towards a de facto stronger green effect. 
 
                                                          
11 The targets have been carefully negotiated under consideration of specific natural resource conditions and national economic and industrial capabilities, 
ranging from 10% in Malta to over 50% in Sweden. 
Fig. 12. The relay model in open game form 
 
 
  
 There are examples where too-bold projects have stranded or backfired. Green 
initiatives to shift taxation from work to pollution and environmental degradation were 
effectively undermined by strong industrial lobbies. The European Commission’s proposal for 
a carbon tax in the early 1990s was thus shot down by powerful pro-carbon lobbies in 
European heavy weight countries like Germany. 
 The launch of a European emissions trading system (EU ETS) was more successful. It 
was introduced more carefully and effectively softened through lavish allocation of 
allowances and generous ‘‘grandfathering’’ that gave large exemptions to existing generation 
capacity. Nevertheless the battle over principles has been won by eco-modernity, and the ETS 
may later be recalibrated to become more effective. 
 Another successful step has been taken with the establishment of direct stimuli to 
green technologies through ambitious feed-in tariffs. By creating a green niche market 
alongside the regular electricity market, the policy initiative did not directly confront 
incumbent industry, and although it was first opposed by incumbent industry in European 
court, the green niche market has come to be accepted. 
A broad set of facilitating policy instruments  
 Out of the European institutional pluralism and the national contest for green 
technological leadership there has emerged a broad set of policy instruments, capable of 
supporting technology development at various stages of maturity in the product cycle 
(Fig. 13): 
 
 Feed-in tariffs have driven the whole host of technologies with tailor-made tariffs for 
individual technologies to trigger learning processes through early technology 
deployment. 
 Certificate models with renewable obligations and competitive pricing have 
stimulated the more mature technologies: particularly bio-based electricity generation 
from forest waste in Scandinavia. 
 The European emission trading system has provided an implicit taxation on carbon 
that has benefitted most mature technologies. 
 
Fig. 13. Policy instruments in the product cycle. 
 
 A monolithic CO2 taxation and emissions trading approach would have failed to drive 
new immature technologies that are still too costly to be favoured by any realistic CO2 
taxation.12
                                                          
12 The EU ETS has seen carbon prices in high periods close to EUR 20/t and in low periods down below EUR 10/t. This translates into price uplifts on 
electricity between 10 and 20%, and is clearly insufficient to drive new immature energy technologies. 
 With only emissions trading and/or carbon taxation, climate policy would risk 
getting stuck in the middle, where realistic levels of CO2 taxation are not sufficient to drive 
the new technologies to replace the current carbon economy, but are still painful enough to 
slow down growth and trigger opposition. 
 By providing much higher, but focused support for deployment of small volumes of 
new green technologies through feed-in tariffs, a number of European policy-makers have 
driven technological learning at affordable costs. Through imposing a minimal tax on 
electricity consumption, the broad ‘‘tax base’’ of the total electricity consumption have 
provided financing for the initial high payments to small volumes of renewables necessary, 
without seriously affecting the electricity price. At intermediate stages of maturity auctions 
and certificate markets have stimulated technology development further. 
 
Fig. 14. (a) Learning curves for wind and photovoltaics. Source: IPCC – SRRN (2011). (b) Forest residues in Sweden and Finland. 
Note: PFF¼Primary forest fuel. Source: Faaij et al. (2005). 
 
 
 
 
  
 The diversity of European policies, catering for different stages of the product cycle, 
has allowed for multiple technologies to emerge. They represent several modernities which 
coexist side by side with one another. The sum of the European technology deployment 
policies has been central to dramatic technological performance improvements in renewables. 
The story of European technology deployment for the maturing of renewables like wind, 
photovoltaics and biomass-based electricity, is a story of remarkable technological success. 
Strong feed-in policies have brought industrial prototypes into dynamic learning processes, 
where costs have been driven down by several orders of magnitude over only a few years. 
This has resulted in rapid expansion and industrial learning. The cost evolution of wind and 
photovoltaics illustrates this progress (Fig. 14a). For both of these technologies, support 
policies and certificate-based niche markets have successfully driven costs down towards 
competitiveness with incumbent technologies. Similar learning has also taken place in bio-
energy (Fig. 14b). 
 Following successful technology development, Europe faces a need to step up market 
pressure. Explosion in feed-in payments in Spain and partly Germany in response to rapid 
expansion of renewables, forced shutdown of subsidies or a transition to adynamic feed-in, 
where the rates had to be constantly lowered to prevent windfall profits for new and more cost 
efficient production. As new technologies have matured under feed-in tariffs, they could also 
transit to certificate and obligations markets and finally to compete with incumbent carbon 
technologies under CO2 emissions pricing. 
Is the battle about to be won? 
 After major successful breakthroughs for several renewables, is the battle of 
modernities about to be won? 
 Clearly Eco-modernity has produced two winning technologies: wind and solar. With 
formidable growth rates ranging from 25 to 50%, the two technologies are positioned to grow 
extensively. Having increased cost-efficiency dramatically over the past decade, these 
technologies are also approaching commercial competitiveness. However, wind in particular 
struggles with an intermittency problem that entails a need for complementary stabilizing 
technology. Furthermore, competing land use and esthetic consideration pushes wind to more 
costly offshore sites. Similarly, solar power is challenged by land use issues for centralized 
applications while its decentralized applications are challenged on esthetic grounds. Despite 
obvious successes, ecomodernity still has serious hurdles to overcome. 
 The incumbent carbon and nuclear modernities have had the advantage of meeting the 
climate challenge with the strength of established positions and resource control. They have 
organizational and commercial resources of the large firm with strong market positions, 
including lucrative control over balancing markets. Furthermore, they enjoy a tailor-made grid 
infrastructure developed to support their central station design. From this position the carbon 
incumbents have successfully met the climate challenge with natural gas. With a formidable 
growth of more than 400% over the last couple of decades, it is the major growth sector in 
European electricity generation. The problem is, however, that gas can only be a transitory 
solution. It represents a major reduction of CO2 emissions compared to coal, but is incapable 
of responding to a more ambitious CO2 reduction policy towards EU ambitions for 2050. 
Efficiency improvements in coaland gas-based technologies can only add marginally to this. 
 The engagement in CCS to deliver a more fundamental transition to close-to-zero 
emissions has come late and has not yet made a convincing breakthrough in cost-reduction 
and efficiency. CCS technology at its present state incurs great efficiency losses and added 
costs which prevent large scale rollout anytime soon. Furthermore, CCS also suffers from lack 
of social acceptance, which has spilled over to political refusal to designate underground 
storage in several German L¨ander. Both technological setbacks and social legitimacy remain 
therefore serious hindrances to meeting the climate challenge within the carbon modernity 
paradigm. 
 Similarly, nuclear modernity – the incumbent industry’s most radical answer to the 
climate challenge – has failed to achieve civic or social legitimacy. It took 20 years to move 
towards a revival after Chernobyl. The Fukushima accident re-activated fear and once again 
reminded the public in western democracies of their distrust of nuclear safety. It does not 
make the situation any better that nuclear industry after half a century of operation has failed 
to find long-term storage for nuclear waste that is acceptable to the public. Furthermore, the 
stop-go character of nuclear development has affected its economic performance. Against this 
background, radical greening of European electricity through nuclear modernity remains 
highly questionable and is explicitly off the agenda in several influential West European 
countries, such as Germany, Sweden, Austria and Switzerland. 
 As we have observed, demand-side eco-modernity is still lagging behind. As opposed 
to CCS, the problem is not primarily technological, but mainly institutional. Further 
unleashing of demand-side potentials may need re-regulation of deregulation, where the 
commercial efficiency of deregulated energy markets is taken further into removal of barriers 
to energy efficiency in the interface between electricity and other sectors. Flexible interplay 
between electricity markets and various off-grid and energy efficiency measures needs to be 
guaranteed and supported. Reduction of institutional barriers to resource-efficiency is needed 
to tap into the huge demand-side potentials. 
 To sum up, carbon modernity has come up with a viable midtermsolution – gas – but 
failed to generate a credible long term response. Promising accelerated growth in wind and 
photovoltaics raises hopes for a substantive contribution from eco-modernity, yet exploiting 
its full potential will need mainstreaming and institutional alignment. Demand-side eco-
modernity – being a disruptive innovation – remains a challenging vision, and will need 
institutional transformation. 
Europe’s way forward 
 Following its early leading renewable energy initiatives, Europe continues to flag 
advanced ambitions: In the aftermath of the publication of a number of other low carbon 
visions, the European Commission in December 2011, launched the ‘‘Energy Roadmap 2050”. 
The roadmap commits the EU to reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 80–95% below 1990 
levels by 2050, depending on necessary reductions by other developed countries. 
 A pre-condition for sustained successful climate leadership is for Europe to continue 
to move on several modernity-frontiers. Building on European diversity in resources, 
competencies and political preferences, the Continent has produced an interesting variety of 
climate approaches. 
 Demand-side eco-modernity continues to be a challenging project. While battles 
obviously are being fought between the carbon incumbents and supply-side eco-modernity, an 
even more fundamental fissure remains between supply-side and demandside solutions. 
Tapping seriously into this modernity becomes an important prerequisite for EU’s ambitious 
plans. 
 In the context of current financial and economic crises, growth and employment 
become paramount. A strong motivation behind European renewables stimulation policies has 
been to launch green growth. As a result of Europe’s early engagement and role as a lead 
market, the continent has fostered some of the major wind turbine and photovoltaic module 
manufacturers. With a business model built on outsourcing and rapid technology-transfers, 
however, technology monopoly is not retained over a long time. The expanding US and Asian 
markets are providing major roles for non-European players. 
 While the Danish wind pioneer, Vestas, holding 14.8% of the global market for wind 
turbines, retained a leading position in 2010, a Chinese company has advanced to the second 
position, followed by US and Chinese firms. Leading German and Spanish players trail 
behind with market shares around 6–7%, but they are challenged by the Indians and the 
Chinese in the same marketshare range (Table 1a).  
 In photovoltaics Chinese and Taiwanese firms have held six of the ten slots including 
the top two (Photovoltaic Barometer, 2011) (Table 1b). This development has unfolded 
rapidly and Chinese firms, in 2010, had more than 50% of the global photovoltaic module 
production, against less than 15% in 2006.  
 However, the massive growth of the European market for renewable energy entails 
many European jobs. A large part of the value of wind, as well as photovoltaic systems is 
created further downstream and closer to the consumers and generates European business and 
jobs. Furthermore, while European firms have lost market shares, the relative over-capacity, 
especially in photovoltaics, following the rapid scale-up of Asian production, has reduced 
module prices further and thus triggered expansion of eco-modernity.  
 Furthermore, the price-hike on energy and other resources obviously motivates 
engagement in freely available renewables. As indicated by Fig. 15, critical energy resources 
are becoming increasingly scarcer and more expensive and thus drive prices up dramatically 
in global markets. As one of the most carbon-import dependent regions, Europe may have 
motivation to stay on the green course.  
 The lesson from the European experience is that transitions across modernities 
necessitate engagement with a broad spectrum of policy tools: commercial, political, 
technological and communicative. Our analysis also highlights the importance of well 
calibrated policy initiatives and awareness of their interaction with other realms. Europe, in 
this respect, has the advantage of an institutional pluralism residing in the complex European 
political mosaic. The same pluralism, however, challenges scalability, as solutions need to be 
mainstreamed into dominant solutions. If Europe is to succeed in following its past lead 
market initiatives and living up to its pioneering visions for a close to carbon-free electricity 
market in 2050, it needs to cleverly manage this balance. 
 
Table 1: Top wind and solar cell producers globally. Sources: Wind: Renewables 2011—global status report; Solar: Photovoltaic Barometer no 5, 2011.  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 15. Energy prices scaling-up. Source: Index Mundi 
 
  
 
  
 The EU has, over the last couple of decades, through dynamic stimulus policies, 
provided lead markets for core renewable technologies such as wind and solar. Impressive 
performance improvements and growth rates indicate that they are now approaching 
commercial viability. The starting point for the next phase of the relay run is a maturing green 
electricity industry with considerable influence and potential job creation. Europe therefore 
seems to be coming close to a green tipping point also with respect to institutional power, as 
indicated in the EU’s ambitious 2050 roadmap. Three hurdles need to be overcome, however: 
(1) accommodation of the new East and Central European ‘‘catch-up’’ economies still very 
much embedded in carbon modernity; (2) tackling of green industrial ‘‘leakage’’ to Asia; and 
(3) institutional inertia in demand-side ecomodernization. 
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